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The Constitutionality of Certain Indirect
Approaches to Raising the
Assessment Level
By ELVIS J. STAHR, Jr.
EDITOR'S NOTE: Mr. Stahr is Dean of the University
of Kentucky College of Law and a member of the Kentucky and
New York bars. He holds A.B., B.A. in Jur., B.C.L., and N.A.
degrees.
It seems plain common sense that
among the most effective methods the
legislature might employ to effect the
raising of assessments toward the goal
of fair cash value would be the enactment of statutes giving practical
incentives to property owners and to
local assessment officers to start raising the level of assessments at the
grass roots. The constitutionality of
several types of such incentives will
be considered briefly in this article,
which is a summary of, longer memoranda of law.
I
May-the legislature prohibit the
writing of property insurance in
amount greater than the assessed
value of the property tp be insured.
It is believed that it could constitutionally do so, for several reasons.
(a) Public policy. Equitable assessment of property for tax purposes,
which does not now exist in Kentucky,
but which would indisputably be in
the public interest, can only be
achieved by adopting the same standard throughout the state. The standard prescribed by section 172 of the
Kentucky Constitution is fair cash

value. A statute whose object was to
aid in achieving that standard would
seem to have overriding considerations
of public policy in its favor.
(b) Constitutional mandate. It is
the duty of all branches of the state
government to give effect to the state
Constitution. A statute which sought
to implement an express mandate (section 172) of that Constitution, even
by indirection, would be entitled to
the most favorable possible consideration by the courts.
(c) Power of legislature to limit
corporate powers. The powers of
domestic corporate insurers are limited
to those set forth in their charters,
and those of foreign corporate insurers to those permitted by the laws
of the state where they seek to do
business. In Kentucky, the powers of
the latter may not exceed those of the
former (Constitution 202; Allin v.
American Indemnity Co., 246 Ky.
396). The powers of both may be
restricted or revoked by the legislature
at any time. Constitution 37 provides
that "every grant of a franchise, privilege or exemption, shall remain subject to revocation, alteration or amendment." See Orient Ins. Co. v. Daggs,
172 U. S. 557.
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1lence it would seem that limits on
the amount of insurance which companies may lawfully write on any one
piece of property may be set by the
legislature, in the exercise of its power
to amend or revoke corporate powers
and privileges. The only specific constitutional restriction is that it must

of risk in any one policy (32 C. J.,
p. 983, 44 C. J. S., p. 522; Glens Falls
Ins. Co. v. Hawkins, 126 S. W. 1114).
The amount of new business an insurance company may do may be
limited by statute (Bush v. New York
Life Ins. Co., 119 N. Y. Supp. 796).
Limitation of risks has been said to
act through a general law (Constitu- be constitutional in opinions 8f the
tion 59 [17]).
Supreme Court (German Alliance Ins.
Co. v. Lewis, 233 U. S. 389; National
A puzzling question as to the state's
power to regulate foreign insurance Ins. Co. v. Wanberg, 260 U. S. 71).
corporations has existed since the de- The right of the state to guard against
cision, in U. S. v. South-Eastern Un- overinsurance has also been recogderwriters Assn., 322 U. S. 533 nized (1 Couch on Ins., sec. 74b; see
(1944), that insurance business is in- Hartford Live Stock Ins. Co. v. Gibterstate commerce when carried on son, 256 Ky. 338).
across state lines. A careful study of
It might be argued that the legislathe M cCarran Act (15 U. S. C. 1011- ture, in enacting the type of statute
1015), together with subsequent Su- under consideration, had violated secpreme Court cases involving the point, tion 1 (5) of the Kentucky Constituleads to the conclusion that, so long tion, which provides that all men have
as Congress refrains from regulating the inherent and inalienable right "of
interstate insurance business, the acquiring and protecting property."
states will retain their previous power
But does this mean the state is comto do so, in all respects involved in pelled to permit a citizen to "prothe instant problem. See 164 A. L. R. tect" more taxable property than he is
500 and 34 A. B. A. J. 539.
willing to pay taxes tipon? It must
be remembered, too, that, in regulating
(d) Police power of legislature to insurance, the legislature may abridge
regulate insurance. The Constitution
the liberty of contract of both insurer
of Kentucky does not mention insur- and policyholder. Hartford Live Stock
ance, hence contains no specific limi- Ins. Co. v. Gibson, supra ("Contract
tation on the power of the legislature rights are not absolute but must yield
to regulate it. Insurance is a business to the public good"); Hartford Acaffected with a public interest and cident Co. v. Nelson County, 291 U.
therefore may be regulated in the S. 352 ("The business of insurance is
exercise of the police power. "Corpoone peculiarly subject to supervision

rations engaged in the business, both
domestic and foreign, must conform
their business and contracts to the provisions of the statutes in the states
where they do business. . . . This
power . . . to regulate the business of
insurance is very broad." See 1 Couch
on Ins., sec. 244, and cases there cited.
Virtually every aspect of the business has been subjected to regulation
by statutes of the various states, and
their constitutionality has been upheld.
See 36 A. L. R. 1512 and 72 A. L. R.
1173. A statute may limit the extent

and control .

. .

. Liberty of contract

is not an absolute concept. It is relative to many conditions of time and
place'and circumstance. The constitution has not ordained that the forms
of business shall be cast in imperishable moulds"-per Cardozo, J.) ; Kenton, etc., v. Goodpaster, 304 Ky. 233
("Because of the public interest an
insurance company and its policyholders do not have the inviolate rights
which characterize private contracts.")
Two excellent pronouncements on
the limits of the police power in regu-
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lating insuraiicc

arc the opiion Of

the Supreme Court in German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Kansas, 233 U. S.
389, and the opinion of Commissioner
Stanley of the Court of Appeals in
Kenton, etc., v. Goodpaster, supra.
Both should be carefully studied,
though space does not permit lengthy
quotation from them here.
(e) The power to regulate insurance may be exercised in indirect aid
of another power. This proposition
has already been sustained in Kentucky. Everyone is familiar with the
common type of statute prohibiting a
murderer from collecting the proceeds
of his victim's insurance, but I refer
more particularly to such statutes as
KRS 281.450-470, requiring certain
insurance policies on taxicabs ant
city busses to conform to certain
standards, and providing that insurance companies shall not be relieved
of liability on such policies until the
expiration of a fixed period after
notification to the state of intention
to cancel, regardless of any contract
between the parties. These statutes
were held constitutional and applied
in Maryland Casualty Co. v. Baker,
304 Ky. 296, wherein Judge Dawson
wrote:

cascs.1 ;

. . .

and where rcstrictive pro-

visions of a liability policy conflict
with statutory requirements, the
statute must control." (Emphasis
added.)
Equally or more significant is the
case of Gross v. Commonwealth, 256
Ky. 19, which dealt with the constitutionality of KRS 281.080. The Court
wrote in part: "The appellant attacks the constitutionality of this
quoted provision . . . for the reason,
he contends, that . . .the Legislature

. ..is without power to delegate the
wide, unbridled authority which it
possesses to legislate to a subordinate
commission, which is here attempted,
he asserts, in this act in delegating to
the tax commission the undefined and
unlimited authority to fix the amount
of the insurance to be carried by taxi
owners 'in such penal sums or maximum amounts as said Commission
may deem necessary,' etc. . . . H6wever, we do not agree that . . . the
statute here attacked is to be held invalid .... [The statute] clearly repre-

sents an exercise by the Legislature of
the state's police power to regulate
and govern the transportation for hire
of persons and property by motor vehicles on the state's public highways,
for the protection of the interests and
". .. These statutes were enacted by
welfare of its thus traveling citizens.
the legislature in the exercise of its
The means adopted by the Legislature
police power for the safety and pro- for their protection in the exercise of
tection of. the public in its transpor- this police power, so long as they have
tation dealings with common carriers an ascertainable relevancy to the obor operators of motor vehicles for ject sought, are within the scope of
hire upon the highways of the Com- that power." (Emphasis added.)
monwealth. . . .The policies involved
The important point is that the
here were executed in order that the
Court
clearly recognized that the legtaxicab owner might retain his permit
could fix the amount of inislature
and continue the operation of his
surance to be carried, and the main
business, and the policies and the
issue was merely whether it could
statutes must be read and construed delegate that power. The Court held
together. . . .As a general rule statu-. it could. The regulation of insurance
tory requirements are to be considered was held a valid, constitutional means
in construing contracts of insurance, of aiding the police power to promote
and mandatory statutory provisions safety on the highways. No ascertainable reason exists why regulation of
must be .read into the policies [citing
Annual Meeting, State Bar Association, Louisville, Kentucky, April 6 and 7, 1949
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insurance could not be a valid means
of aiding the taxing power as well, or
of aiding in implementing the express
constitutional mandate regarding assessments. As a matter of fact, the
taxing power has frequently been declared by the courts to be a supreme
attribute of sovereignty, as is the
police power.
(f) If doubt exists as to the constitutionality of a statute, it will be
resolved in favor of validity. This is
a maxim too well known to require
documentation here.
(g) A statute limiting the amount
of risk would be no more "unreasonable" a regulation than existing valued
policy statutes or statutes regulating
amount of premium, amount of proceeds payable, amount of reserves,
amount of dividends, kinds of investments, or amount of deposits, or prohibiting discrimination in rates, rebates, and so on. Yet all these things
have, over and over, been held constitutional. The statute under consideration would be in the public interest
and reasonably calculated to assist in
attaining the public goal of fair value
assessments for tax purposes. That
is sufficient in the circumstances.
Incidentally, the scope of any such
statute would presumably be limited
to insurance on real property improvements.
II
A less stringent incentive than that
just considered might be provision for
the creation of a legal or administrative presumption that, where property
is insured, the "fair cash value" is
not less than the value for which it
is insured. The presumption is reasonable in fact, and no serious constitutional question would seem to arise
if the statute were properly framed
and if the presumption were made
rebuttable.
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III
Another effective method for indirect stimulation of local assessments
might be' to distribute state financial
aid for local schools derived from the
so-called school equalization fund on
some basis which would reflect directly the extent to which the local
units are helping themselves by meeting certain minimum requirements as
to assessment. For instance, it might
prove effective to distribute this aid
on the basis of the extent to which
the local unit is approaching assessment at 100 per cent of market value.
A formula for determining the amount
of aid in proportion to the improvement in assessment could be worked
out by comparing the amount of revenue produced locally at the existing
ratio to full value with the amount
which would be raised by a 100.per
cent valuation. There would seem to
be no constitutional obstacle to the
use of this or any other method inasmuch as the only pertinent provision,
section 186, as amended in 1940, provides:
the General Assembly shall by
general law prescribe the manner of
the distribution and use of the public
school fund for public school purposes. Provided that each school district in the Commonwealth shall receive on a census pupil basis its proportionate part of at least ninety per
cent of any fund accruing to the
school fund. The remainder of any
fund accruing to the school fund may
be distributedupon other than a census
pupil basis." (Emphasis added.)
Further, at the present time KRS
157.053 requires the Kentucky Tax
Commission to certify to the State
Board of Education that any board of
education applying for aid from the
equalization fund has a ratio of assessed valuation of property to fair
cash value equal to the average ratio
throughout the state. This statute, enacted in 1942, has not been challenged
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and there is no reason to believe that
the formula provided therein or any
other would make similar legislation
unconstitutional. Any doubt, that the
purpose of the 1940 amendment to
section 186 creating the equalization
fund and permitting it to be distributed
on other than a census pupil basis was
to leave the legislature unrestricted in
the matter is dispelled by the opinion
in Talbott v. Kentucky State Board
of Education, 244 Ky. 826, which
hastened the adoption of the amendment by deploring in no uncertain
terms any constitutional restrictions on
distribution of state aid to schools.
IV
Under present practice, railroad
property and public service corporation franchises are valued by the Department of Revenue at "fair cash
value." This valuation is then reduced
to a figure-now 80 per cent-which
is supposedly the average of assessment ratios for all counties. The reduced valuation is then allocated by
standard rule and certified to the local
taxing districts which assess taxes on
that valuation regardless of whether
the local assessor is assessing other
property in the district at a 40 per
cent or 100 per cent ratio. As a result counties with low ratios actually
take tax money away from hardpressed counties with high ratios.
It would seem fairer to equalize
after allocation. In addition to being
fairer, equalization after allocation
would provide some incentive for
counties with low assessment ratios to
bring them up to the state average.
Could the Department of Revenue
value such property at full cash value,
allocate it to the counties and then
require the local taxing authorities to
equalize this property at the local rate
before assessing the tax against it?
Could the Department at the same
time assess for state taxes on the
same basis or on full value as reduced
under the present formula? These

problems are not simple, but it is
submitted that the proposals may be
found to satisfy the Constitution.
At one time there was no equalization of railroad property with locally
assessed property, and the Court of
Appeals held that the resulting denial
of equality did not prevent the 100 per
cent assessment of railroad property
(Louisville Ry. v. Commonwealth,
105 Ky. 710). The Supreme Court of
the United States, however, sustained
an injunction a few years later in
L. & N. R. Co. v. Greene, 244 U. S.
499, on the ground that the systematic assessment of railroad property
at 75 per cent by the state while local
property was assessed at 52 per cent
was discriminatory. Ever since that
time there has existed an uneasy truce
under which the Department in its
valuation takes the average assessment
ratio sufficiently into account to prevent the utilities from objecting. It is
submitted that the rule of the Greene
Case would be equally well satisfied
by requiring the utility to resort -to
the county equalization board for
equalization. If the Department .itself puts such an equalization into
effect in advance of certification there
would seem to be no objection insofar as local taxes are concerned.
If the state property tax were also
assessed on the basis of the total of
the equalized allocations, it might
raise some question of uniformity (see
Mobile R. Co. v. State Tax Comm.,
374 Ill. 75, and J. W. Martin, Research Report to the Virginia Public
Service Tax Study Committee, p. 85),
although that question would appear
to be little, if any, more serious than
uniformity questions which might be
raised with respect to the present procedure. If the state tax continued to
be levied on the basis now used (average of county ratios), there would
seem to be no new constitutional objection arising from the fact that a
different system was used for equalizing local taxes.

Annual Meeting, State Bar Association, Louisville, Kentucky, April 6 and 7, 1949

